Ways of Worldmaking
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Required reading at more than 100 colleges and universities throughout North America.
for the structure of concepts, and that now proceeds to exchange the structure of concepts for the structure of the several symbol systems of the sciences, philosophy, the arts, perception, and everyday discourse. The movement is from unique truth and a world fixed and found to a diversity of right and even conflict ing versions or worlds in the making. HARVARD UNIVERSITY The following abbreviations are used throughout the book: SA for the third edition of The Structure of Appearance, D.
for A4 as there is for "tree", or none as for "t"? If "tree·term" means merely "expression having the same extension as 'tree' ", then the notion of a paraphrase for "Pegasus" is as gratuitous as the notion of a paraphrase for "t". But "Pegasus" unlike "t" is a word belonging to the category of names, and the results of compounding it with such other words as "picture" or "description" are terms that have non·nuD exten· sions. The extensions of such compound terms are secondary extensionst of
Philosoph". Vol. 69 (1972), pp. 649-665. VERSIONS AND VISIONS 11.21 5 plausibility< be regarded as the only truth about the only world. But the evidence for such reducibility is negligible, and even the claim is nebulous since physics itself is fragmentary and un stable and the kind and consequences of reduction envisaged are vague. (How do you go about reducing Constable's or James Joyce's world-view to physics?) I am the last person likely i \ i I I: f I to underrate construction
what are inductively right categories, and so to a third kind of rightness in general: rightness of categorization. Such rightness is one step further removed from truth; for while deductive and inductive right· ness still have to do with statements, which have truth·value, rightness of categorization attaches to categories or predicates or systems thereof-which have no truth· value. 128 ON RIGHTNESS OF RENDERING I VIIA] On the question what distinguishes right inductive categories from
in Perceiving producing it. Recognizing patterns is very much a matter of inventing and imposing them. Com prehension and creation go on together. I shall return in Chapters VI and VII to many of the questions surveyed here. Now I want to consider two much more specific topics: in Chapter II. a subtle categorization peculiarly significant for the arts; and in Chapter III. a sample tracing of a notion across versions in various systems and media. 14 I allude here to Charles S. Peirce's